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Abstract 
This article provides evidence on the effect of unemployment insurance on 
unemployment and subsequent employment duration in Europe using 
individual data from the European Community Household Panel. Country-
specific estimates based on a multivariate discrete-time duration model, which 
takes into account dynamic selection issues and the endogeneity of benefit 
receipt, suggest that although receiving benefits has an adverse effect in the 
sense of increasing unemployment duration, there is also a positive effect 
associated with the increased duration of subsequent employment. This 
beneficial effect of unemployment insurance on employment stability is 
pronounced in countries with relatively generous benefit systems, and for 
recipients who have remained unemployed for at least six months. These 
findings are in line with theories that suggest a matching effect of 
unemployment insurance. 
 
Keywords: Unemployment Insurance; Unemployment Duration; Employment 
Stability; Job Match Quality; Unobserved Heterogeneity 
JEL Classification: J64; J65; C41 
                                                 
#  I am grateful to Christian Belzil, Andrea Ichino, Karl Schlag, Jan van Ours, the editor 
and the three anonymous referees for many helpful comments. This paper has also 
benefited from comments and discussions with Manuel Arellano, Samuel Bentolila, 
Pierre Cahuc, Ana Rute Cardoso, Deborah Cobb-Clark, Muriel Dejemeppe, Armin 
Falk, Dimitris Georgarakos, Dan Hamermesh, David Jaeger, Pierre-Carl Michaud, 
Ludovic Renou, Uwe Sunde, Prodromos Vlamis, and participants at ESPE, EUI, the 
IZA Workshop on Labor Markets and Institutions, and Tilburg. Any remaining errors 
are only mine. Financial support from the EUI and the CentER at Tilburg, as a Marie 
Curie Training Site under contract HPRN-CT-2000-00134, is gratefully acknowledged. 
This article is a substantially revised version of IZA Discussion Paper No. 1163  
entitled “The Effect of Unemployment Insurance on Unemployment Duration and 
Subsequent Employment Stability”. Correspondence: IZA, Schaumburg-Lippe-Str. 5-
9, 53111, Bonn, Germany. e-mail: tatsiramos[at]iza.org. 
1. Introduction 
That unemployment insurance (UI) has disincentive effects on job seeking 
behavior and on unemployment duration is the conventional wisdom in modern 
labor economics. Policy recommendations often suggest a reduction in the 
generosity of UI as a way to remove these disincentives. By focusing only on 
the disincentives of UI, however, such policy discussions fail to take into 
account the potential beneficial effects of UI on post-unemployment outcomes. 
By allowing more time and more resources for search, generous unemployment 
benefits may improve the match between the unemployed and the available job 
vacancies. Consideration of these positive features of the UI system is very 
relevant in the European context. The challenge of achieving full employment 
is a long-term target, which requires not just attracting more individuals to the 
labor market but also ensuring employment stability. Surprisingly given their 
policy relevance, there is no empirical evidence for Europe estimating the two 
effects. 
This paper contributes to the empirical literature by modeling both 
unemployment and employment transitions for a number of European countries 
employing individual level data from the European Community Household 
Panel (ECHP). The analysis focuses on the effect of benefit receipt on 
unemployment duration and on subsequent employment duration, which is a 
measure of employment stability, including job-to-job transitions. The main 
novelty of the paper is that it considers a number of countries which vary in the 
generosity of the UI system and belong to different institutional regimes. This 
allows us to examine to what extent the effect of UI varies across countries. 
The econometric analysis adopts a reduced-form approach by estimating 
a multivariate discrete-time hazard model addressing two important issues: (a) 
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the endogeneity of benefit receipt, and (b) the endogeneity of previous 
unemployment duration on subsequent employment duration. The effect of UI 
is identified by a comparison between recipients' and non-recipients' outcomes. 
Unlike many other studies which identify the effect of UI benefits by using 
variation in the level and potential duration of benefits, the ECHP provides 
limited information on these features of the UI system. Instead, a time-varying 
indicator of benefit receipt can be constructed. Identification of the effect of 
benefit receipt relies on observing multiple unemployment and employment 
spells. Moreover, by allowing for unobserved heterogeneity in the selection 
equation to be correlated with the transition equations, the selection effect is 
identified separately from the causal effect of receiving benefits. 
The empirical results suggest that receiving unemployment benefits 
significantly reduces the hazard of leaving unemployment, leading to longer 
unemployment duration. Moreover, the effect of receiving benefits on 
unemployment duration is larger in countries with relatively more generous UI 
systems, such as Denmark, France, Germany, and Spain compared to countries 
such as Greece and Italy, in which the UI system is underdeveloped. Despite 
this, there is a beneficial effect of UI on subsequent employment stability. 
Specifically, the hazard rate out of employment is lower for previously 
unemployed benefit recipients relative to non-recipients. This effect is 
pronounced (a) in those countries with relatively more generous benefit 
systems, and (b) for recipients who have spent at least 6 months in 
unemployment. These findings are in line with the hypothesis that UI has 
beneficial effects on post-unemployment outcomes and suggest that the 
magnitude of the effects varies by the generosity of the UI system. 
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the 
theoretical framework and the existing empirical evidence, while Section 3 
describes the data employed for this study. The econometric model is presented 
in Section 4, and the results of the empirical analysis in Section 5. The 
conclusions of the study are drawn in the last section. 
 
2. Theoretical Arguments and Empirical Evidence 
The job search paradigm is the dominant theoretical tool used to analyze the 
behaviour of unemployed workers searching for a job (see Lippman and 
McCall, 1979). Whether set in a partial or in a general equilibrium setting, 
standard search theory predicts that an increase in UI benefit generosity 
increases the duration of unemployment. Unemployed workers exert lower 
search effort as the opportunity cost of search is lower and they choose higher 
reservation wages. Moreover, closer to benefit exhaustion, the value of 
unemployment drops since the marginal benefit of search increases and the 
reservation wage falls, leading to a higher exit rate out of unemployment 
(Mortensen, 1977; Burdett, 1979). Empirical studies find evidence that the 
probability of escaping unemployment rises when unemployment benefits lapse 
(Ham and Rea, 1987; Meyer, 1990).1
At the same time, UI benefit generosity may also affect post 
unemployment outcomes by improving job matching. Ehrenberg and Oaxaca 
(1976) were the first to consider the effect of UI on post-unemployment 
                                                 
1 See Devine and Kiefer (1991) and Atkinson and Micklewright (1991) for surveys of the related 
literature. 
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outcomes finding a positive effect of benefits on post-unemployment wages.2 
Quantifying the beneficial effect of UI on post unemployment outcomes has 
been challenging due to the scarcity of large micro data sets with information 
both on labor market histories and UI benefits. Because wages are not the only 
state variable sufficient to summarize individual well-being, this strand of the 
literature measures the effect of UI generosity on post unemployment outcomes 
with the incidence of unemployment, or the time elapsed between re-
employment and acceptance of a subsequent job, using job matching arguments 
based on Jovanovic (1979).  
In a series of papers, Belzil (1992, 1995 and 2001) analyzes 
unemployment experience and employment duration in the context of the 
Canadian UI reform finding that the incidence of voluntary unemployment is 
positively correlated with the duration of the preceding spell of unemployment 
and benefit exhaustion, and a weak positive relationship between re-
employment duration and unemployment benefit generosity. Recently, Centeno 
(2004) studies the effect of the generosity of US benefit levels and finds that 
larger UI benefits lead to longer subsequent employment spells. Van Ours and 
Vodopivec (2008) investigate the effect of reducing the potential duration of 
unemployment benefits in Slovenia and find that it strongly increased job 
finding rates but had no effect on the quality of post-unemployment jobs3  
The macro literature has also devoted interest to the lifecycle effects of 
                                                 
2 More recently, Addison and Blackburn (2000) review the literature and provide results which 
suggest a weak effect of UI on re-employment wages. 
3 Baker and Rea (1998), focusing on a single duration, analyze the impact of benefit duration on 
the exit out of the current job in Canada using temporary layoff arguments based on Feldstein 
(1976). For a study using U.S. data see Jurajda (2002). 
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UI. Hansen and Imrohoroglu (1992), focusing on the consumption smoothing 
and the disincentive effect of UI, show that even in the presence of moral 
hazard optimally designed unemployment insurance programs can yield 
positive welfare benefits. The utility gain of a generous UI through 
consumption smoothing has been empirically documented by Gruber (1997). 
Acemoglu and Shimer (1999) show that the increased utility of unemployment 
when receiving UI induces workers to search for higher wages and firms 
respond by creating high-wage, high-quality jobs. The role of UI as a "search 
subsidy", which may improve the allocation of resources, has been 
demonstrated by Burdett (1979). This channel suggests that benefits have an 
effect on the subsequent employment duration by helping workers to get jobs 
which are compatible with their skills and therefore less likely to dissolve 
(Marimon and Zilibotti, 1999). 
 
3. The Data 
The analysis in this paper is based on individual data from the European 
Community Household Panel (ECHP, 1994-2001). The ECHP is a survey 
based on a standardized questionnaire with annual interviewing of a 
representative panel of households and individuals of the population in each 
country, covering a wide range of topics including demographics, employment 
characteristics, education etc. In the first wave, a sample of some 60,500 
households - approximately 130,000 adults aged 16 years and over - were 
interviewed in the then 12 Member States. There are three characteristics that 
make the ECHP relevant to this study. The simultaneous coverage of 
employment status, the standardized methodology and procedures yielding 
comparable information across countries and the longitudinal design, in which 
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information on the same set of households and persons is gathered. The 
countries studied are Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Spain, 
and the U.K, which differ in the features of the UI system representing four 
different “institutional regimes” that prevail in Europe. 
 
3.1 Institutional Regimes 
The empirical literature has identified the generosity of unemployment 
insurance as a major factor affecting unemployment rates in Europe (Nickell et 
al., 2005). Unemployment insurance is the main scheme where eligibility is 
based upon previous employment and contribution histories. Unemployment 
assistance, which is not available in all countries, is usually means tested and it 
is available for those who exhaust unemployment insurance and those who are 
not eligible. 
In general, it is difficult to rank the countries in terms of their generosity 
with respect to UI as the system depends on a number of parameters such as 
eligibility conditions, level and duration of payments. However, following 
Esping-Andersen (1990) and Bertola et al. (2000), one can broadly define four 
regimes: 1) The universal welfare state regime, which includes Denmark and 
the Scandinavian countries. This regime is characterized by flexible labor 
markets and generous welfare policies (flexicurity), which are financed by 
relatively high taxes on labor income and/or social security contributions. The 
UI system can be characterized as generous both in terms of the benefit level 
and benefit duration. 2) The conservative welfare state regime, which includes 
Germany, Austria, France, Belgium and the Netherlands. The main difference 
from the first regime is that, in principle, the social transfers are related to 
previous earnings and the means-tested social transfers act as a residual safety 
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net. In terms of generosity of the UI system, the universal and the conservative 
welfare state regimes can be considered to be relatively similar. 3) In Southern-
European countries such as Italy, Greece, Spain and Portugal, the prevailing 
institutional regime relies on family ties rather than on social insurance. 
Compared to both the universal and the conservative welfare state regimes, 
mandatory social security contributions are relatively low. In terms of the UI 
system, these countries provide limited insurance, although some countries, 
such as Spain, resemble the second group in terms of generosity. 4) The liberal 
welfare state regime, which includes the United Kingdom and Ireland, features 
relatively flexible labor markets as well as means-tested social transfers with 
low income taxes and social security contributions compared to the universal 
and the conservative welfare regimes. The UI system provides flat rate 
payments with relatively short duration. 
The eight countries analyzed in this study represent each of the four 
regimes in terms of important differences in the generosity of the UI system 
determining the labor market behavior of the unemployed. Details on the main 
characteristics of the UI system (eligibility conditions, payment rate and 
duration) and the differences across these countries are summarized in Table 
B.1 in Appendix B. 
  
3.2 Inflow Sample and Transitions 
Using the monthly calendar of labor market activities for the years 1994-2001, 
individual labor market histories are constructed up to December 2000. The 
sample consists of all the flow spells from employment into unemployment 
such that all unemployment spells occur at the end of an ongoing employment 
spell. The analysis is focused on 20-60-year-old males because of their higher 
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attachment to the labor market. It is important to note that following the 
transitions of each individual over time implies that multiple spells of 
unemployment and employment are recorded. This allows for sufficient 
variation for the identification of the model as discussed in the next section.4
Unemployment spells can end in one of the following two ways: by re-
entering employment, or by leaving the labor force. Unemployment spells that 
last longer than the end of 2000 are treated as right censored. Transitions from 
unemployment to employment are considered as completed spells, while 
transitions from unemployment out of the labor force are considered as 
continued unemployment spells. That is, the duration of unemployment for 
those who have been out of the labor force is the sum of the duration of the 
initial unemployment spell and the duration of the spell out of the labor force. 
This is consistent with the fact that the majority of those unemployed who exit 
to inactivity either re-enter unemployment, or enter directly into employment.5
Transitions in the sample are depicted in Table 1, where the first column 
shows the number of unemployment spells observed for each country. Between 
63% (Germany) and 78% (Greece) of these unemployment spells end in 
employment. The third column depicts the share of those employment spells 
which end back in unemployment. This varies from 27% (U.K.) to 63% 
                                                 
4 The countries not considered in the analysis include the Netherlands and Sweden, for which the 
information from the calendar of activities is not reported; Austria and Finland, which entered 
the ECHP in 1995 and 1996, respectively, and Belgium and Portugal. For the last four, the 
inflow unemployment sample is small so there is no sufficient variation in the transitions to 
identify the main parameters of interest. 
5 The alternative is to treat those who exit to inactivity as right censored unemployment spells. 
The sensitivity of the results under this alternative assumption is discussed in section 5.4.1. 
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(Greece). For Italy, Spain and Greece the percentage of employment spells 
which end in unemployment is much higher. These are also countries with an 
unemployment rate above the European average. 
[Table 1 about here] 
3.3 Description of Data on Unemployment Insurance 
The effect of UI is identified by a comparison between recipients’ and non-
recipients’ outcomes. This approach is in contrast to many other studies which 
identify the effect of benefits by using variation in the level and potential 
duration of benefits (e.g. Belzil, 1995, 2001; Card and Levine, 2000; Katz and 
Meyer, 1990; Lalive and Zweimüller, 2004; Van Ours and Vodopivec, 2008) 
using primarily administrative data.  
The reason for following this approach is that the information related to 
unemployment insurance in the ECHP is rather limited and it is based on two 
main sources: a) whether an unemployed person receives benefits at the time of 
the interview and b) the amount of benefits received during the year. The first, 
however, is not informative for short spells that might not coincide with the 
time of any interview, and the second is not sufficient to construct the benefit 
level for a particular unemployment spell, as an individual might be 
unemployed twice during a year. Consequently, both sources of information in 
the data are used to distinguish recipients from non-recipients and to construct 
a measure of benefit duration. This constructed benefit duration variable, which 
coincides with unemployment duration for those who still received benefits at 
the end of the unemployment spell, is used to define a time-varying indicator of 
receiving benefits during each month of an unemployment spell. This benefit 
indicator equals one if an unemployed person still receives benefits during the 
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spell and zero otherwise.6
Table 2 shows summary statistics of the unemployment spells in the 
sample. The first column for each country refers to those receiving benefits 
during unemployment, while the second column refers to the non-recipients. 
Benefit recipients tend to be less educated, older, more likely to be married 
with more children and to have spouses who are non-employed. Moreover, they 
experience longer average unemployment duration than non-recipients. Benefit 
receipt depends on the eligibility criteria, which differ across countries, and is 
related to previous employment history and other individual characteristics. 
The observed variation across countries in the share of the unemployed 
receiving benefits reflects the different eligibility criteria that apply to each 
country. 
[Table 2 about here] 
3.4 Kaplan-Meier Survivor Functions 
A preliminary analysis for the effect of UI based on the Kaplan-Meier survivor 
functions for recipients and non-recipients is presented in Table 3. The first 
panel, which refers to the unemployment spells, indicates that the percentage of 
recipients who are still unemployed after 12 months is higher in comparison to 
non-recipients. For instance, 48% of recipients in France are still unemployed 
after 12 months compared to 36% for non-recipients. The survival rate after 12 
months for recipients vs. non-recipients for Germany is 49% vs. 28%, for 
Ireland 36% vs. 20%, for Spain 31% vs. 22%, and for the U.K. 43% vs. 26%. 
The second panel of Table 3 depicts the survival rate for employment spells 
                                                 
6 A detailed discussion on the use of the available information in the data to construct the benefit 
indicator and the benefit duration can be found in Appendix A. Section 4 introduces notation and 
discusses the use of the time-varying benefit indicator in the statistical model which is analyzed. 
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stratified by benefit receipt during the previous unemployment spell. After 12 
months in employment, the percentage of those who survived is higher for 
previously unemployed recipients in Denmark, France, and Germany. 
 [Table 3 about here] 
The analysis, however, of employment histories based on a simple 
comparison of survival rates between recipients and non-recipients might be 
confounded by individual characteristics associated with benefit receipt. 
Moreover, dynamic selection might exist due to unobserved characteristics that 
can be correlated across the two states. To address these issues, a statistical 
model is required that takes both the endogeneity of benefits and the dynamic 
selection due to unobserved heterogeneity into account. 
 
4. Econometric Analysis 
4.1 The Statistical Model 
The econometric analysis of unemployment and employment duration is based 
on a multivariate discrete-time duration model. According to the standard job 
search model, the per-period escape rate out of unemployment is equal to the 
arrival rate of job offers times the probability that an offer will be accepted. 
This motivates the estimation of transitions out of unemployment by means of 
unemployment hazard functions. The hazard function which is defined as the 
probability that the spell is completed at time t , given that it has not been 
completed before t , is the basic building block of the discrete-time duration 
model. The job offer arrival probability is a function of personal characteristics 
and labor market conditions, while the acceptance probability is a function of 
leisure preferences and income from unemployment benefits. The transitions 
out of employment can be modeled similarly by means of employment hazard 
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functions, which depend on previous receipt of unemployment insurance, 
previous unemployment duration and on the elapsed time in employment. This 
framework is consistent with the job matching model of Jovanovic (1979). This 
reduced-form approach is also consistent with both theories of job search and 
job matching, which focus on the rate at which individuals leave the state at 
duration t  given that they have not yet done so. 
Given our data, the exact benefit duration is not available. What is 
observed is whether the benefit entitlement is as long as the unemployment 
duration. Therefore, both unemployment duration ( ), employment duration 
( ), and benefit entitlement duration ( ) are treated as discrete random 
variables that are subject to censoring. While censoring of unemployment and 
employment duration refers to the situation in which an individual is still in the 
state at the time of leaving the sample, censoring of the benefit entitlement 
duration depends on being shorter than unemployment duration. That is,  is 
observed if ( ) and equals to  otherwise. This feature of the data is 
similar to Bover et al. (2002) and motivates as the basis for the empirical 
analysis of the relationship between  and 
uT
eT bT
bT
bT T< u uT
uT B the hazard functions 
0
1
( ) [ | , ]
( ) [ | , ]
u u u u u u b u
u u u u u u b u
t P T t T t T t
t P T t T t T t
λ
λ
= = ≥ <
= = ≥ ≥     (1) 
where denotes realizations of the stochastic duration of an unemployment 
spell . The hazard function 
ut
uT 0 ( )u utλ  defines the probability of exiting 
unemployment at conditional on being unemployed until for those who do 
not receive benefits at . Similarly, the function 
ut ut
ut 1 ( )u utλ  defines the 
probability of exiting unemployment for those who still receive benefits at ut . 
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Formulating the analysis in terms of the hazard functions has an advantage 
relative to a regression or correlation analysis between uT  and bT , which is 
difficult to interpret. The difficulty in interpreting a regression between  uT  and 
bT  stems from the fact that, with limited benefit duration, individuals who do 
 receive benefits anymore tend to exhibit longer unemployment duration. 
However, the comparison between the hazard functions in equation (1) is 
meaningful because both probabilities are conditional on being unemployed for 
ut  periods (see Bover, et al. 2002, pp. 234). 
Relying on the observed censored
not
 benefit du n i d  the 
efit 
ratio nstea  of
ben entitlement durations has the drawback that it is not possible to identify 
how the unemployment hazard rate for recipients changes closer to the time of 
benefit exhaustion. In theory, the hazard rate is expected to increase as the time 
of benefit exhaustion approaches (Mortensen, 1977; Burdett, 1979). Therefore, 
specifying the hazard function 1 ( )u utλ  for unemployed recipients, which does 
not vary as benefit exhaustion aches, has two implications. For those 
whose benefit exhaustion occurs before ut , the hazard based on 1 ( )u ut
 appro
λ  will be 
overestimated. Hence, the difference w h respect to non-reci will be 
underestimated. In contrast, for recipients at ut  who are close to benefit 
exhaustion the hazard rate will be underestimated (as in theory their hazard is 
expected to increase closer to exhaustion), so the difference with respect to the 
non-recipients will be overestimated. Therefore, the estimated difference can be 
viewed as a weighted average of the differences between those without benefits 
and those with benefit entitlement greater than ut . As the hazard rate is 
expected to change depending on the time to bene it exhaustion, the benefit 
it pients 
f
 14 
indicator ( ) ( )u b ub t I T t= ≥  is treated as predetermined and not as strictly 
exogenous probability of exiting unemployment can be 
conditioned on the path of ( )b t  up to ut , but not on ( 1)ub t
. That is, the 
+ , ( 2)ub t + , etc., 
as the entire path of benefit tion mi t affect the h  t ual. 
 
dura gh azard for he individ
4.2 Parameterization 
ployment ( ) and employment ( ) can be observed for Multiple spells of unem u e
each individual. The hazard function for an individual  i   for a spell  k   from 
the state ,j u e=  is defined as 
) [jik jiky P T( | |  , ] ( )jik jik jik jik jik jik jikt t T t y F yλ = = ≥ =  (2) 
where denotes a cumulative distribution function (cdf) whi( )F ⋅ ch is specified 
below. For the unemployment spell, where j u= , the index jiky  is defined as 
4
0 1 2
1
( ) ( )uik u u uik u ik u u ikd u
d
y X b tβ β δ β
=
= + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅∑ I t  (3) 
The benefit indicator  has a subscript which indicates that it is spell 
ight 
( )ik ub t k  
specific and, thus, m vary for the same individual across multiple 
unemployment spells. The vector uikX  includes personal characteristics and 
economic variables which refer to th ar the unemployment spell started, and 
therefore they are fixed within a spell but allowed to vary across spells. Among 
the personal characteristics are age dummies, education dummies (defined 
using the ISCED classification), marital status, the number of children and 
whether the spouse is employed. The economic variables include the regional 
unemployment rate at the time of entering unemployment. The effect of 
duration dependence is modeled by using time dummy variables denoted as 
e ye
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( )ikd uI t ,  which are equal to one when duration ut  is within the duration 
 denoted by the subscript  (1, 2,3,4).dintervals =   These intervals are defined 
as  1d =   for 1-6 months of duration,  2d =   for 7-12 months,  3d =   for 12-
24 m s, and  4d =   for more than onths. For the empl nt spell, 
where 
onth  24 m oyme
j e= , the i jiky  is defined as: ndex 
3 4
0 1 1 2 2
1 1
( )
u
u
e ik e eik e d ik e ikd e
d d
b I tβ β δ δ τ β
= =
= + + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅∑ ∑  (4) 
where  denotes realizations of the stochastic duration of an employment spell 
eik e ey X⋅
et
eT . The variable eikb  is a dummy for the individual having received benefits 
ing the previous unemployment spell k . The vector eikdur X  includes personal 
characteristics and economic variables, s ilar to the unemployment hazard, 
which refer to the year the employment spell started and that are fixed within a 
spell but also allowed to vary across multiple employment spells. The 
specification additionally includes a dummy for being employed in a part time 
job in the vector eik
im
X  and three interval dummies for the previous 
unemployment duratio enoted as 
ud ik
n, d τ , where  (1, 2,3)ud = . Finally, the 
effect of duration dependence is mo d by usin my variables 
denoted as ( )ikd e
dele g time dum
I t , which are defined similarly as in the unemployment 
hazard. The intervals for the duration dependence and the dependence on 
previous unemployment duration in the employment hazard are chosen in order 
to reflect the distinction between the short- and long-term unemployed, as they 
are usually defined.
Using the hazard functions in equation (2), the contribution of the 
unemployment and employment spells to the likelihood can be defined for each 
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individual for a given spell. Let 0jT  denote the observed censored duration for 
,j u e=  so that  if  and 0 0j jT T= j jT C< j jT C=  otherwise, where  is the 
censored observed duration. The contribution of a completed unemployment 
and emp pell is n by th itional d
f t t tλ λ= −∏   (5) 
while the contribution of a censored spell is given by the conditional survival 
function 
j
j j j j
t
S t tλ
=
= −∏    (6) 
The total sample likelihood is given by the product of 
L L L
jC
loyment s give e cond ensity function7
0 1
1
j
j
T
j j j j j j
t
−
=
( | .) ( | .) (1 ( | .))
0
jT
1
( | .) (1 ( | .))
the individual likelihoods 
1i
( ) ( ) ( )u
N
c
u u e eθ θ θ=∏    (7) 
where 
=
1
j j ( ) [ ( | .)] [ ( | .)]j j
c c
j j jL f t S tθ −= ,θ  ( uθ  and eθ ) are the parameters to 
be estimated and  is the number of spells. The dummies  equal one for a 
completed spell ( ) and zero for a censored spell (
N jc
j jT C< j jT C= ). Note that 
the employment spells are contributing to th d when the e likelihoo
unemployment spell is not censored ( 1cu = ). Following Narendranathan and 
Stewart (1993), Sueyoshi (1995), Jenkins (1995) and Bover et al. (2002), the 
likelihood in equation (7) can be wr in the form of a standard log-
likelihood function for binary variables as 
{ }0
1
N
i
λ λ
=
itten 
j j j j t j j j t j jL T t c Y t c Y tlog 1( ) log ( ) (1 ) log 1 ( )j j ⎡ ⎤= ≥ + − −⎣ ⎦∑  (8) 
                                                 
7 Abstracting from and and making the conditioning on  implicit. i k jiky
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where  equals to one if the observed duration equals to  that is
jt
Y jt , , 1jtY =  if 
0
j jT t≥ . Combining  for all observed durations the samp d 
can be written as 
u u u e e
i
L l c l
j
N
L le log likelihoo
{ }
1
log ( ) ( ) ( )θ θ θ
=
= +∑   (9) 
where for ,j u e=  
( )
0 01
0
1 1
( )j j jl cθ = log 1 ( ) log ( ) 1 log 1 ( )
j j
j j
T T
j j j j j j j
t t
t T c tλ λ λ
−
= =
− + + − −⎧ ⎫⎪ ⎪⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤⎨ ⎬⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦⎪ ⎪⎩ ⎭∑ ∑  (10) 
To estimate the model it is necessary to specify an expression for the hazard 
rate. Following the standard practice in the literature (see, for instance, 
Cameron and Heckman, 1998; Bover et al., 2002; Ham and LaLonde, 1996, 
among others), the hazard is specified as the logistic so that in equation (2), 
jλ = ( ) /(1 )z zF z e e= + .8  
 
 4.3 Unobserved Heterogeneity and Endogeneity of Benefits 
he model so far assumes that all the individual variation in the hazard 
iables and that 
                                                
T
functions can be characterized by the observed explanatory var
the transitions across unemployment and employment are independent. In the 
presence of unobserved individual characteristics, however, such as motivation 
 
8 An alternative specification is the complementary log-log, which has the property that the 
resulting model is the discrete-time counterpart of the underlying continuous-time proportional 
hazards model (see Prentice and Gloeckler, 1978). Sueyoshi (1995) shows that a binary response 
hazard model, employing a logit specification, will be slightly less proportional than the extreme 
value specification, while a probit specification will tend to depart from proportionality far more 
than the logistic models. 
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or unobserved human capital variables, the coefficient estimates of the effect of 
benefits and duration dependence are expected to be downward biased. The 
reason is that dynamic selection occurs since those with high values of the 
unobserved variables on average exit unemployment faster. Hence, individuals 
who are still unemployed at high durations tend to have lower values of the 
unobserved variables and thus lower hazards. This leads to spurious negative 
duration dependence and to a lower observed difference in the hazards between 
recipients and non-recipients than the true average difference. The latter 
happens as the sample of non-recipient survivors, who have a higher hazard, 
has on average lower values of the unobserved variables than the sample of 
recipient survivors. A similar selection due to unobserved heterogeneity might 
occur in the employment state. To address these dynamic selection issues the 
model is extended to allow for correlated unobserved heterogeneity relaxing 
the assumption of independent transitions. 
The hazard functions, allowing for unobserved heterogeneity, can be 
written as 
( | , ) ( )jik jik jik ji jikt y F yλ ε =    (11) 
where the error terms jiε  enter additively in the index , which are defined 
in equations (3) and (4) for the unemployment an mployment hazard, 
jiky
d the e
respectively. One issue that arises in the presence of unobserved heterogeneity 
is that the benefit indicator in the unemployment hazard, which is a 
predetermined variable, is endogenous as it is correlated with the unobserved 
term. The endogeneity of benefits is addressed by specifying a reduced form 
process for ( )ub t . This procedure follows Bover et al. (2002), who consider a 
single spell model of unemployment duration, and is analogous to the treatment 
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of initial conditions by Ham and LaLonde (1996) in their evaluation of training 
on a multivariate model of unemployment and employment spells.  
The process for benefits specified as the probability to receive benefits at 
each period conditional on having received benefits up to that period can be 
writte
s the logistic cdf and the index is defined as 
n as 
( | , ) [ ( ) 1 |  ( 1) 1, , ] ( )bik bik bik bi ik b ik b bik bik bi bikt y P b t b t T t F yλ ε ε= = − = ≥ =  (12) 
where F  i
4
0 1 2
1
( )bik b b bik b ikd b bi
d
y X I tβ β β
=
= + ⋅ + ⋅ +∑ ε   
The vector of characteristics 
(13) 
bikX  and the duration dummies ( )ikd bI t
loyment hazar
 are 
defined similarly to the ones in the specification of the unemp d 
and bε is the individual unobserved term that is associated with benefit receipt. 
Combining the unemployment transitions with the logistic process for 
benefits and the employment transitions, the joint log-likelihood defined as 
Llog ( , , , )u b eθ ε ε ε  is equal to 
{ }N l l c l dG
1
log exp [ ( , ) ( , )] [ ( , )] ( , , )u u u b b b u e e e u b e
i
θ ε θ ε θ ε ε ε ε+ +∑  (14) 
=
∫∫∫
where ( , )u u ul θ ε and ( , )e e el θ ε are defined as in equation (10) and ( , )b b bl θ ε is 
defined as 
T
b b b b b b b b bb t b t− +∑  (15) 
with  for all 
Following Heckman and Singer (1984), the unobserved heterogeneity 
ution is   a discrete distribution with the support points denoted 
[ ]{ }
ut
t b t tλ ε λ ε
=
− −
0
1
( 1) ( ) log ( , ) (1 ( )) log 1 ( , )
u
(0) 1b = i . 
distrib  defined as
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by , , ,, , )u p b p e p(ε ε ε  and the corresponding probability mass given by 
, , ,Pr( , , )u u p b b p e e p pε ε ε ε ε ε π= = = = , where P  denotes the number of 
t is, it is the same across multiple spells 
of unemployment or employment. However, the unobserved factors are 
allowed to be different and correlated across unemployment and employment 
spells. Introducing an unobserved factor in the benefits selection equation, 
which can be correlated with the unemployment and employment transitions, 
captures selection effects across these transitions. The sample log-likelihood 
can be written as follows 
P π=
support points. Each unobserved factor is assumed to be time invariant and 
individual-specific for each state. Tha
p p
p
L L
=
∑     (16) 
where  is defined as in equation (14) for a specific mass point 
1
log log
log pL p . The 
model is estimated jointly by maximum likelihood. 
entification for a general class of univariate single spell discrete-time 
 discussed by Cameron and Heckman (1998). They show 
 
4.4 Identification 
Id
duration models is
that identification is enhanced if the index varies with duration, which is 
satisfied as the benefit indicator is a time-varying variable. Even with a 
constant index, their Theorem 4 shows that the model is identified if attention 
is restricted to finite mixture distributions of the type defined in the previous 
subsection. It is important to note that the data do not provide information on 
drawing from the mixing distribution of unobserved characteristics G  in 
equation (18). The information on G  comes from the observed interaction 
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between duration t  and the observed individual characteristics. As with linear 
panel data models, observing mu ple outcomes for given unobserved 
heterogeneity values can be exploited to deal with unobserved heterogeneity 
under conditions that are mild relative to the single-spell case (Abbring and 
Van den Berg, 2003). 
Identification of the model in the context of this paper with a benefit 
selection equation reli
lti
es on observing multiple unemployment spells, which 
provid
iment, the sample observed making a transition into employment 
might
 
e within-worker variation on the benefit indicator. The variation of the 
benefit indicator for an individual across multiple spells of unemployment is 
due to the eligibility criteria that dictate when an unemployed is eligible to 
receive UI. By exploiting this variation at the individual level and allowing 
unobserved heterogeneity in the selection equation to be correlated with the 
unemployment transition equation, the selection effect into benefits is 
identified separately from the causal effect of receiving benefits on 
unemployment duration. As an example of such selection one can think of 
individuals who are more likely to be benefit recipients and also less likely to 
be re-employed because of unobserved differences in their labor market 
attachment. 
Even if the receipt of UI were exogenously determined in the sense of a 
natural exper
 be a selected sample of the initial flow sample into unemployment due to 
the effect of unobserved heterogeneity. To distinguish, therefore, the causal 
effect of benefits from a spurious one both the unemployment and employment 
transitions are modeled jointly taking into account this selection by way of 
correlated unobserved heterogeneity. 
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5. Empirical Results 
The model described in the previous section is estimated for each country 
eparately. The results for the effect of benefits on both unemployment and 
s are presented first in section 5.1, followed by the 
stimates of unemployment benefit receipt for 
oth unemployment and employment transitions. As discussed in section 4, the 
n is captured by the time-varying 
received benefits during the previous unemployment spell and zero for the non-
stima
s
employment transition
estimates for duration dependence and the distribution of unobserved 
heterogeneity in section 5.2, and finally by the estimates of the other 
characteristics in section 5.3. Sensitivity analysis is presented in section 5.4 and 
some simulations in section 5.5. 
 
5.1 The Effect of Unemployment Benefits
Table 4 reports the coefficient e
b
effect of benefits on unemployment duratio
benefit indicator ( )ub t . For the employment duration, the effect of benefits is 
captured by the dummy variable ( ),b  which equals one for those who have 
recipients. To check the sensitivity of the benefit effect on the employment 
duration, two specifications are e ted. The first (Employment I) includes 
only the benefit dummy, while the second one (Employment II) allows for an 
interaction of the benefit dummy with previous unemployment duration. The 
motivation is to identify any heterogeneous effects of benefits on employment 
stability for different unemployment experiences. If benefits provide the time to 
find a better job by increasing the available information to the worker, then the 
ek
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effect on employment stability is expected to be larger for those who have 
searched for a longer time period.9
[Table 4 about here] 
5.1.1 Unemployment Hazard. The results indicate that receiving unemployment 
e 
effect 
                                                
benefits has a significant negative effect on the unemployment hazard, which is 
a standard result in the literature. A comparison of the size of the coefficients 
across countries shows that the effects vary in a way which seems to be 
correlated with the generosity of the UI system. In particular, the effect is larger 
in countries which belong to more generous welfare state regimes such as 
Germany (-0.555) and France (-0.422) in the conservative regime, and 
Denmark (-0.486) in the universal one. This is also the case for the effect for 
Spain (-0.412), which more closely resembles the conservative regime in terms 
of UI generosity. Lower effects are observed for Italy and Greece, which 
belong to the Southern-European regime with less generous benefits.  
Finally, for Ireland, which belongs to liberal welfare state regime, th
of receiving benefits is not significant. For the U.K., however, a large 
negative and significant effect is observed. This effect is likely to be over-
estimated for two reasons. The first is related to the way exits to inactivity are 
treated. As discussed later in section 5.4.1, when those spells that end in 
inactivity are considered as right censored spells and not as continued 
unemployment spells, the coefficient drops to (-0.411). The second is related to 
the data preparation steps described in Appendix A, according to which very 
short spells that are typically re-entries to unemployment after a short 
 
9 Polachek and Xiang (2006) find that, in countries that strongly support UI, workers receive 
wages closer to their potential as a result of a longer search period which reduces incomplete 
information. 
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employment spell are considered as non-recipients. Therefore, the difference in 
the hazard between recipients and non-recipients (with shorter durations) is 
likely to be overestimated. 
 
5.1.2 Employment Hazard. The effect of having received benefits during the 
 
unemp
erved Heterogeneity
                                                
previous unemployment spell (Employment I) has a negative effect on the 
hazard from subsequent employment in all countries. That is, although 
receiving benefits lowers the unemployment hazard, the overall evidence 
suggests that recipients experience longer post-unemployment employment 
duration. In terms of differences across countries, for those which belong to the 
more generous welfare state regimes (Denmark, France, Germany), the effects 
are larger and highly significant. For the countries with relatively less generous 
UI systems the effects are smaller (Greece, Italy) or not significant (Ireland). 
For these countries, the effect of UI on unemployment duration is also smaller. 
Investigating the sensitivity of these results to the length of the previous
loyment duration, the estimates of the second specification (Employment 
II) suggest that the effect of benefit receipt is higher for those who exit 
unemployment after 6 months in countries with more generous welfare state 
regimes such as Denmark, France, and Germany. This is consistent with the 
idea that generous UI increase the quality of job match by providing with more 
time and more resources for search.10  
5.2 Duration Dependence and Unobs
 
10 Employment Protection Legislation (EPL) through firing costs might also have an effect on 
job duration and employment stability. However, the results are based on a comparison between 
recipients and non-recipients in each country conditional on observed and unobserved 
heterogeneity, so any other institutional characteristics such as EPL are fixed. 
 25 
The model is estimated jointly allowing for unobserved characteristics such as 
.2.1 Duration Dependence. Table 5 reports the coefficient estimates for 
] 
5.2.2 Unobserved Heterogeneity nobserved heterogeneity 
is specified with two mass points )
motivation and preferences that might affect both the exit out of unemployment 
and subsequent employment. This might lead to a spurious correlation between 
unemployment duration and employment stability and spurious duration 
dependence, since those with more favorable labor market characteristics leave 
the state earlier. 
 
5
duration dependence in both unemployment and employment hazard functions. 
To avoid imposing a functional form, duration dependence is captured in a 
flexible way by introducing duration dummies grouped in intervals of 6 
months, with the reference category defined as the duration between 1 to 6 
months. In the unemployment equation, the existence of negative duration 
dependence is observed in all countries. The negative effect on the hazard out 
of unemployment is larger the longer the time spent in unemployment. In the 
employment equation, there is a non-linear relationship between duration and 
the hazard rate. In particular in Germany, Greece, and Italy, workers in 
employment for 6 to 12 months are more likely to exit compared to those with 
less than 6 months. For the rest of the countries the effect is not significant. 
However, those who remain employed for more than 12 months are less likely 
to exit employment. In Denmark and Germany, negative duration dependence 
is significant for durations above 24 months. 
[Table 5 about here
. The distribution of u
,1 ,1 ,1( , ,u b eε ε ε  and ),2 ,2 ,2( , ,u b eε ε ε , with 
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probabilities 1π  and 2π , respectively. For identification, with a constant term 
in the model the first mass point is no s point 
is the deviation from the constant.  
Allowing for two mass points is a very standard approach in hazard 
models (see Van Den Berg, 2001).
rmalized to zero so the second mas
 Monte Carlo results by Baker and Melino 
(2000
11
12
) show that in a single duration model with flexible duration dependence, 
adding additional mass points sacrifices efficiency and introduces a potentially 
very large bias, even in very large samples. On the other hand, ignoring 
unobserved heterogeneity leads to a negative bias in estimated duration 
dependence and biases the coefficients on observed heterogeneity towards zero. 
In the current specification with a vector of three unobserved random effects, 
one for each equation, there are two probabilities to be estimated with a mixing 
distribution that has a logit specification. Therefore, conditional on observed 
characteristics and the time spent in the current spell, there are two types of 
individuals that differ in their unemployment and employment hazards, and the 
probability to receive benefits.  Table 5 shows that in each country there is a 
group which has a higher exit rate both from unemployment and employment. 
The probability of the type with a high exit rate from unemployment and 
employment is about 65%-70% for Denmark, France and Germany, while it 
varies from 20% in Italy, to 30% in Greece, and 50% in Spain.
                                                 
11 Sensitivity ysis which relaxes the restriction on the number of types and the number of 
mass points is disc n 5.4.3. 
12 In so benefit equation appeared to be very small. 
This can be caused by all variation in the time varying benefit indicator. The time 
inus infinity. 
anal
ussed in sectio
me countries one of the mass points in the 
the sm
variation is achieved by benefit recipients exhausting benefits before leaving unemployment. In 
the estimation this parameter was fixed to m
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5.3 The Effect of Other Characteristics 
The coefficient estimates for the other characteristics are reported in Table C.1 
e estimates of the benefit receipt 
sults for the effect of other individual 
haracteristics on unemployment hazard can be summarized as follows:13 the 
is significant in France, Germany, Ireland, and Italy. For the U.K., a negative 
effect of secondary education on the unemployment hazard is observed, which 
                                                
in Appendix C, which also includes th
equation. During the first month, this equation refers to the probability of 
receiving benefits after becoming unemployed, while in subsequent months it 
refers to the probability of being entitled to benefits having remained in 
unemployment up to that month and having received benefits in the previous 
month. These probabilities depend on the eligibility rules for unemployment 
insurance and the provision of the UI system in terms of benefit duration. 
Given the complexity of the rules and the fact that this equation is just an 
auxiliary reduced-form, there is no attempt to provide an interpretation of these 
coefficients. The focus of the following discussion will be based on the 
unemployment and employment hazards. 
 
5.3.1 Unemployment Hazard. The main re
c
unemployed who are over 50 years old (the reference age group) have lower 
exit rates from unemployment, while those who are more educated, married, 
and have more children, are in general more likely to leave unemployment. The 
positive effect of secondary and higher education on the unemployment hazard 
is significant only at the 10% level, while for Greece and Denmark the effect is 
 
13 Each hazard function includes year dummies for the year entering unemployment and 
employment, respectively. 
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also negative but not significant. The effect of business cycle, as this is 
captured by the regional unemployment rate at the time of entry into 
unemployment, shows that a higher regional unemployment rate increases re-
employment probabilities although the effect is insignificant, while there is a 
negative and significant effect for Italy. 
 
5.3.2 Employment Hazard. The specification in the employment hazard 
includes dummies for previous unemployment spells of a length of 1-6 and 7-
12 months, respectively. The reference group refers to those employed with 
duration of previous unemployment of more than 12 months. Controlling for 
e receipt of benefits and other individual characteristics, shorter previous 
of the unemployed with those spells that end in inactivity being treated as 
th
unemployment experience is associated with lower hazard out of employment 
for France, Germany, and the U.K., although the coefficients are not 
significantly different from zero. In Italy and Spain, short unemployment 
duration increases the hazard from subsequent employment. The results for 
other characteristics can be summarized as follows: more educated, younger, 
married, and full-time workers are less likely to exit employment. The age 
effect seems to be reversed for France and Greece. For France, in particular, a 
large positive effect on employment hazard is observed for the age group 20-24 
years old. The regional unemployment rate at the time of entering employment 
is positive and significant for Germany, Italy and Spain, suggesting a business 
cycle effect in which employment stability is worse in thin markets. 
 
5.4 Sensitivity Analysis 
5.4.1 Exits to Inactivity. The results of Table 4 are based on the inflow sample 
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continued unemployment spells. To evaluate the sensitivity of this sampling 
strategy, the model is estimated treating the spells of those who exit to 
activity as right censored unemployment spells. Table C.2 presents the 
t of UI on both the unemployment and employment 
es a function of 
revious earnings, which is correlated with the education level, as, for instance, 
in
coefficients for the effec
hazards, which are similar with the results presented in Table 4. The only 
exception is the benefit coefficient in the unemployment equation for the U.K., 
which drops from -0.721 to -0.411. However, the benefit effect in the 
employment equation is not different between the two models. 
 
5.4.2 Heterogeneous Effect of Benefits across Education Groups. From the 
analysis it so far appears that benefit receipt increases the duration of 
unemployment spells but also leads to more stable employment. Moreover, the 
size of the effects is related to the generosity of the UI system. Although the 
benefit level is not observed, the benefit level is in most cas
p
in Germany. To the extent that education is correlated with the level of benefits 
through earnings, it is possible to identify heterogeneous effects of benefit 
receipt for different education groups. Table C.3 reports the estimated 
coefficients of the main effect and its interaction with high and medium 
education. For the unemployment equation the interaction effects are not 
significantly different from zero. This suggests there is no heterogeneity in the 
effect of benefits across education groups in unemployment. For the 
employment equation, recipients with high education in Germany exhibit 
higher exit rates as compared to recipients with less than high education. This 
suggests some heterogeneity which might be related to an incentive effect to re-
enter unemployment for highly educated workers who are entitled to higher 
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benefit levels. The opposite holds in Denmark, where the negative effect of 
benefit receipt on employment hazard is mainly found for highly educated 
workers. 
 
5.4.3 Sensitivity of the Unobserved Heterogeneity Specification. The coefficient 
estimates of Table 4 and Table 5 are based on the model allowing for two mass 
points, so six parameters are estimated taking into account the normalizations 
and one free probability. Relaxing the restriction in the probabilities and 
considering all eight possible groups that can be formed the model is estimated 
ith seven free probabilities. The coefficient estimates for the effect of benefits w
on the unemployment and employment hazards suggest that the results are not 
sensitive to this restriction. Only for France the coefficient of benefit receipt on 
unemployment duration exhibits a large drop from -0.422 to -0.248. However, 
the coefficient estimates for the employment hazard are very similar in the two 
models and the differences across countries are preserved. The model is also 
estimated allowing for three mass points with two free probabilities defined as: 
,1 ,1 ,1 1Pr( , , )u u b b e eε ε ε ε ε ε π= = = =  and ,2 ,2 ,2 2Pr( , , )u u b b e eε ε ε ε ε ε π= = = =   
with 23 11π π π= − − . As it is discussed in Section 5.2.2, Baker and Melino 
(2002) show that adding additional mass points sacrifices efficiency and 
introduces a potentially very large bias. The coefficient estimates based on this 
model reveal that such bias is present mostly for the unemployment hazard. For 
instance, the coefficient for France turns positive. For the employment hazard, 
the coefficient estimates are not altered and the main conclusion that the effect 
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of benefits on employment stability is larger in the countries with more 
generous unemployment insurance systems still holds.14
 
5.5 Simulated Survival Functions 
Simulations of the survival function in unemployment and employment are 
performed for a reference individual to obtain a magnitude of the effect of 
enefit receipt. The reference person is defined as someone 25-29 years old 
 to a non-employed spouse, while the 
 exhibit a higher survival rate in 
                                                
b
with secondary education, married
regional unemployment rate at the entry year into each state is kept at its mean 
value. The coefficient estimates from Model 1 (Table 4, 5, and C.1) are used 
for computing the survival rates, except for the U.K. Based on the discussion in 
the previous section related to the sensitivity of the estimates on the way exits 
to inactivity are treated, the survival rates for the U.K. are computed using the 
estimates from Table C.2, which treats exits to inactivity as right censored 
spells. The survival function is computed for the reference individual for each 
point of the discrete heterogeneity distribution and then weighted using the 
probability estimates for each point. Duration dependence is also taken into 
account. Standard errors are calculated by simulation from the estimated 
asymptotic distribution of the parameters. 
Table 6 reports the simulated survival rate after 6 and 12 months in 
unemployment by benefit status for the reference individual, the corresponding 
standard errors and the t-statistics. The survival rates are in accordance with the 
estimates of Table 4. That is, recipients
 
14 These results are not reported but are available from the author upon request. The log-
likelihood values are reported in Table 5. 
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unemp
ipients with unemployment duration between 1-6 months who are 
now in a full-time job. In line with the coefficient estimates of Table 4, 
recipie
loyment (i.e. lower hazard rate out of unemployment) compared to non-
recipients with the effect being larger in countries with more generous UI 
benefits systems (e.g. Denmark, France, Germany and Spain). The difference in 
survival rates between recipients and non-recipients after 6 months in 
unemployment (denoted as U6 in Table 6) is 16 to 18 percentage points (p.p.) 
for Denmark and Germany, and 14 p.p. for France and Spain, while it is about 
10 p.p. in Italy and Greece, which both have a much less generous UI system. 
After 12 months in unemployment, the difference in survival rates between the 
two groups of unemployed (denoted as U12) is similar, confirming that in 
countries with more generous benefits systems (Denmark, France, Germany, 
Spain) the relative exit rate from unemployment is lower compared to their 
counterparts in countries with less generous systems (Greece, Italy). Both 
differences - U6 and U12 - are significantly different from zero for Germany 
and Spain. 
[Table 6 about here] 
The simulated survival in employment after 6 and 12 months is also 
reported in Table 6, distinguishing between previously unemployed recipients 
and non-rec
nts exhibit a higher survival in employment compared to non-recipients. 
Interestingly, the magnitude of this effect varies across countries in a similar 
way that the magnitude of the effect of benefits varies in unemployment. In 
other words, for the countries with more generous benefits systems, such as 
Denmark, France, Germany and Spain, the difference in employment survival 
rates after 6 months between recipients and non-recipients (denoted as E6 in 
Table 6) is higher compared to countries with less generous systems, such as 
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Greece and Italy. In particular, the difference in survival in employment 
between recipients and non-recipients is about 17 p.p. for Denmark, 22 p.p. for 
France and 15 p.p. for Germany. In contrast, in Greece and Italy this difference 
is 3 p.p. and 5 p.p., respectively. The difference in Spain is 9 p.p., which rather 
resembles the first group in terms of generosity of the UI system. In terms of 
significance, these differences are statistically different from zero for France, 
Germany and Spain. After 12 months in employment, the difference in survival 
rates between the two groups of employed (denoted as E12) increases to about 
30 p.p. in Denmark, France and Germany, and 14 p.p. in Spain, while it 
remains below 10 p.p. in Greece and Italy. Again, these differences are 
statistically significant for France, Germany and Spain.  
Finally, a simple comparison of the differences in survival rates between 
recipients and non-recipients in employment and unemployment (E6-U6 and 
E12-U12) suggests that, for the group of countries which belong to the more 
generous welfare regimes, the net effect is zero after 6 months in employment 
and b
the potential beneficial effect of 
unemp yment insurance on employment stability that results from improved 
 been mostly ignored, especially in the European context. This 
paper contributes to the empirical literature by investigating the effect of UI on 
ecomes positive after 12 months. Although this comparison does not 
result in a significant difference in statistical terms, it suggests that the 
beneficial effect of UI in terms of employment stability is sizeable, 
counteracting the disincentive effect of UI. 
 
6. Conclusion 
Unemployment insurance is known to create disincentives in searching and 
finding a new job. On the other hand, 
lo
job matching has
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unemployment duration and subsequent employment stability for eight 
European countries using individual data from the European Community 
Household Panel (ECHP, 1994-2001). 
The findings suggest that although benefit recipients experience longer 
unemployment spells, UI also has a positive effect on subsequent employment 
stability. This effect of UI on post-unemployment stability is pronounced (a) in 
countries with relatively more generous UI systems such as Denmark, 
Germany, France and Spain when compared to countries such as Greece and 
Italy, 
.p. in the less 
genero
in which the UI system is underdeveloped, and (b) for recipients who 
have spent at least 6 months in unemployment. These findings are consistent 
with the hypothesis that UI may have beneficial effects on post-unemployment 
outcomes. The magnitude of the effect of UI on employment stability varies by 
the generosity of the UI system and it is sizeable in countries with relatively 
more generous UI, counteracting the disincentive effect of UI. 
In particular, recipients have survival rates in unemployment which are 
15 p.p. higher than non-recipients in countries with more generous UI systems 
compared to only 10 p.p. in countries with less generous ones. The difference 
between the two groups of the unemployed in re-employment survival rates is 
about 17 p.p. in countries with generous UI and about 3 p.p-5 p
us ones. This difference in survival after 12 months in employment 
increases to about 30 p.p. for the first group of countries and only to about 10 
p.p. for the second. Comparing the differences in survival rates between 
recipients and non-recipients in employment and unemployment suggests that, 
the net effect is zero after 6 months in employment and becomes positive after 
12 months for the group of countries which belong to the more generous 
welfare regimes. 
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From a policy perspective, these findings suggest that in countries with 
low benefits - both in terms of level and duration - there is scope for increasing 
the generosity of UI to levels of more generous welfare regimes. This will lead 
– ceteris paribus – to positive effects in terms of employment stability and 
productivity due to the matching effect of better insurance. In countries with 
relatively generous UI systems, the findings suggest that reforms toward 
reducing its generosity as a way to reduce the disincentive effects might not be 
the optimal policy as they ignore the matching effect of UI. A better policy 
might be a system with generous benefits that delivers beneficial post-
unemployment outcomes coupled with measures that increase the efficiency of 
the search process as a way to minimize the disincentive effects that generous 
UI can produce. This is in line with recent findings by Blanchard and Tirole 
(2008) on the joint design of UI and employment protection. They conclude 
that, in the presence of limits to insurance due to moral hazard in search, 
making unemployment benefits more explicitly conditional on search and 
acceptance of jobs can bring not only better insurance, but also lower 
employment protection and lower production inefficiencies. Future research 
with a cross-country perspective and better information on benefit levels and 
potential benefit duration should shed more light on the exact net effect of 
unemployment insurance and the extent to which this effect varies by the 
generosity of the UI system in place. 
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 Appendix A: Construction of Benefit Variables 
A1. Benefit Indicator 
The benefit indicator is constructed using the two sources of information 
available at the ECHP, that is, whether receiving benefits if unemployed at the 
time of the interview, and the amount of benefits received during the year. 
Relying only on whether an unemployed receives benefits at the time of the 
interview can be uninformative for short spells, given that they might not 
coincide with the time of any interview. For instance, for spells of type C in 
Figure A.1, which are long enough to reach the time of the next interview, the 
information on receipt of benefits at the time of the next interview is used. 
However, this source of information is not sufficient to distinguish recipients 
and non-recipients for spells like A or B. For these spells, the information on 
the amount of benefits received during the year in which the spell has started is 
used. That is, a positive amount of benefits is associated with receipt of 
benefits. 
[Figure A.1 about here] 
The need to rely on the information for the amount of benefits received 
during a year, in order to identify benefit receipt, creates some difficulties in 
the case some individuals experience two unemployment spells within a year. 
The reason is that it is not immediately clear whether the amount of benefits 
received refers to the first, to the second, or to both spells. Notice that the spells 
in the sample start after the first interview in 1994 (Spells A, B or C). However, 
an individual could be unemployed twice in the year in which the first spell 
starts if another spell has started before the 1994 interview (Spell P) or if the 
individual re-enters unemployment after the first spell in the same year (Spells 
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A and A1, or B and B1). 
ment spell (Spell P) before 
t and receive benefits during the year of entry, both 
e no spell coincides with a month in which the individual has been 
interviewed. The same hold pells A and A1. 
For those who experience another unemploy
entering unemploymen
sources of information on benefits are used to infer the benefit status. That is, if 
the spell is long enough so that it reaches the month of the following interview 
(Spell C), the dummy for receiving benefits at the time of the interview at the 
next wave is used. If the spell is not long enough to reach the next interview but 
reaches the following year (Spell B), the amount of benefits received in the 
following year is used to infer whether the unemployed individual received 
benefits during this spell. Inference for spells of type A is not possible when 
another spell P exists and the unemployed person received benefits during that 
year. Another type of spells for which we cannot infer the benefit status is 
spells followed by another spell in the same year. This is shown in Figure A.1 
as a combination of spells B and B1. If the individual receives benefits in both 
years, it is not possible to associate them with one of the two spells. Notice that 
in this cas
s for the combination of s
Therefore, it is possible to identify recipients and non-recipients, except 
for few cases in which the unemployment spell is very short and does not 
coincide with any month interview, or the individual experiences another spell 
before this spell and receives benefits in the same year. These spells are 
typically re-entries to unemployment after a short employment spell. Given the 
employment requirements for being eligible for benefits, these spells are less 
likely to be associated with benefits as they are preceded by a short 
employment spell. Therefore, they are considered as spells without benefits. 
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A.2 Benefit Duration 
A measure of benefit duration is constructed using the two available sources of 
information on benefits and the unemployment duration. This constructed 
benefit duration variable coincides with unemployment duration for those who 
still receive benefits at the end of an unemployment spell. For instance, 
considering the spell of type C in Figure A.1, if the individual does not receive 
benefits at the time of the next interview but has received benefits during the 
year in which he entered unemployment, then he is considered as a benefit 
recipient who has exhausted benefits at the end of 1994. Similarly, if an 
unemployed person with a spell of type B receives benefits in 1994 but not in 
1995, this spell is considered as if benefits were exhausted at the end of 1994. 
For long spells, a comparison of the benefit receipt indicator at the different 
waves provides information on benefit exhaustion. That is, if an unemployed 
individual receives benefits at the interview in wave 2 but not at the interview 
in wave 3, it is assumed that he has exhausted benefits at the end of 1995, given 
that h
[Insert Table C.3] 
e is still unemployed. Finally, for short spells of type A, benefit duration 
coincides with unemployment duration. 
 
Appendix B: Features of Unemployment Insurance Systems 
[Insert Table B.1] 
Appendix C: Additional Estimation Results 
[Insert Table C.1] 
[Insert Table C.2] 
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P A A1 
B
C
1994 Wave 1 1995 Wave 2 1996 
 
 Table 1. Transitions in the sample by country.
Number of Number of Spells Number of Spells
Unemployment Exit to Exit to
Spells Employment Une ment
enmark 344 258 89
(75.00) (34.50)
rance 696 461 181
(66.24) (39.26)
ermany 1118 709 303
(63.42) (42.74)
r 0 472
(78.06) (63.78)
and 413 307 88
(74.33) (28.66)
Italy 1276 943 518
(73.90) (54.93)
Spain 2372 1822 1015
(76.81) (55.71)
UK 507 395 106
(77.91) (26.84)
mploy
D
F
G
G eece 948 74
Irel
 
Source: ECHP (1994-2001) Own calculations. Percentages in parentheses. 
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Table 2. Summary statistics of unemployment spells by benefit status
B NB B NB B NB B NB
% Receiving Benefits 0.686 0.314 0.590 0.410 0.658 0.342 0.266 0.734
Mean Duration 11.42 6.06 15.35 8.91 18.16 7.60 7.95 8.69
High Educ. 0.267 0.176 0.141 0.196 0.158 0.149 0.115 0.147
Medium Educ. 0.458 0.500 0.484 0.435 0.558 0.552 0.387 0.321
Low Educ. 0.275 0.324 0.375 0.368 0.282 0.298 0.498 0.532
Age 38.55 35.92 35.51 33.85 39.37 36.54 37.31 35.48
Married 0.466 0.389 0.433 0.411 0.631 0.563 0.628 0.524
No. of Kids 0.636 0.537 0.886 0.814 0.763 0.720 0.775 0.689
Spouse Non-Employed 0.246 0.204 0.299 0.242 0.332 0.275 0.415 0.324
B NB B NB B NB B NB
% Receiving Benefits 0.704 0.296 0.204 0.796 0.422 0.578 0.345 0.655
Mean Duration 12.08 7.16 8.16 12.01 11.30 7.82 13.89 10.09
High Educ. 0.058 0.115 0.042 0.038 0.098 0.116 0.371 0.346
Medium Educ. 0.357 0.352 0.272 0.299 0.151 0.208 0.137 0.169
Low Educ. 0.584 0.533 0.686 0.663 0.752 0.676 0.491 0.485
Age 35.97 36.43 39.16 33.52 37.52 32.76 36.41 35.11
Married 0.522 0.467 0.686 0.408 0.662 0.393 0.469 0.463
No. of Kids 1.268 1.057 0.908 0.555 0.900 0.661 0.931 0.894
Spouse Non-Employed 0.402 0.262 0.345 0.269 0.491 0.281 0.314 0.234
Italy Spain UK
Greece
Ireland
Denmark France Germany
Source: ECHP(1994-2001) Own calculations. B denotes "Benefit Recipient" and NB "Non-Recipient". 
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Table 3. Empirical (Kaplan-Meier) Survivor Functions by Benefits Status
Months B NB B NB B NB B NB
1 0.970 0.972 0.978 0.944 0.982 0.935 0.964 0.968
6 0.466 0.300 0.648 0.516 0.666 0.432 0.327 0.426
12 0.303 0.199 0.484 0.362 0.497 0.282 0.201 0.227
Months B NB B NB B NB B NB
1 0.969 0.943 0.973 0.967 0.973 0.944 0.971 0.949
6 0.635 0.345 0.397 0.553 0.529 0.438 0.635 0.380
12 0.360 0.200 0.206 0.352 0.307 0.223 0.435 0.265
Months B NB B NB B NB B NB
1 0.994 0.974 0.989 0.985 0.996 0.983 0.990 0.993
6 0.879 0.865 0.845 0.747 0.909 0.843 0.675 0.766
12 0.748 0.771 0.727 0.592 0.719 0.674 0.273 0.488
Months B NB B NB B NB B NB
1 0.969 0.969 0.986 0.989 0.985 0.980 0.992 0.985
6 0.875 0.904 0.711 0.752 0.672 0.719 0.883 0.894
12 0.793 0.829 0.336 0.542 0.483 0.540 0.822 0.823
A. UNEMPLOYMENT SPELLS
Denmark France Germany Greece
Ireland Italy Spain UK
B. EMPLOYMENT SPELLS
Denmark France Germany
Ireland Italy Spain UK
Greece
Notes: ECHP(1994-2001) Own calculations. B denotes "Benefit Recipient" and NB "Non-Recipient". 
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Table 4. Effect of Benefit Receipt on Unemployment and Employment Hazards
COEF. S.E COEF. S.E COEF. S.E COEF. S.E
Unemployment 
Receiving Benefits -0.486 0.257 -0.422 0.144 -0.555 0.121 -0.274 0.135
Employment I
Received Benefits -1.133 0.333 -1.416 0.183 -1.320 0.189 -0.191 0.142
Log-Likelihood
Employment II
Received Benefits -1.536 0.606 -1.679 0.268 -1.397 0.265 0.005 0.253
Received Benefits* 0.534 0.683 0.450 0.333 0.123 0.303 -0.241 0.259
Unem. Duration (1-6)
Log-Likelihood
COEF. S.E COEF. S.E COEF. S.E COEF. S.E
Unemployment 
Receiving Benefits 0.090 0.261 -0.331 0.130 -0.412 0.075 -0.721 0.233
Employment I
Received Benefits -0.243 0.432 -0.381 0.147 -0.516 0.088 -2.130 0.361
Log-Likelihood
Employment II
Received Benefits -0.633 0.518 -0.433 0.222 -0.624 0.126 -2.364 0.456
Received Benefits* 0.692 0.551 0.071 0.228 0.165 0.137 0.381 0.454
Unem. Duration (1-6)
Log-Likelihood
-1178.24 -1317.83 -1328.68 -1429.03
Ireland Italy Spain UK
-1305.02 -1293.51
Denmark France Germany
-1359.04 -1391.79
Greece
-1305.02 -1293.51 -1359.04 -1391.79
-1178.24 -1317.83 -1328.68 -1429.03
Notes: The unemployment and employment hazard functions are estimated jointly, taking the 
endogeneity of benefits into account and allowing for correlated discrete unobserved 
heterogeneity. Employment I is the specification which includes the dummy of being a benefit 
recipient during the previous unemployment spell, while the Employment II specification allows 
for an interaction with the previous unemployment duration. The coefficient estimates for 
Unemployment Hazard refer to the Employment I specification. The model is estimated separately 
for each country including individual characteristics and year dummies for the year entered 
unemployment and employment, respectively. 
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Table 5. Duration Dependence and Unobserved Heterogeneity Distibution Estimates
COEF. S.E. COEF. S.E. COEF. S.E. COEF. S.E.
Duration Dependence
Unemployment
Months 6-12 -0.556 0.188 -0.378 0.128 -0.302 0.101 -0.311 0.102
Months 13-24 -1.023 0.233 -0.493 0.133 -0.908 0.121 -1.253 0.158
Months 24+ -2.135 0.362 -1.354 0.203 -2.124 0.179 -2.155 0.245
Employment
Months 6-12 0.367 0.262 -0.093 0.183 0.774 0.152 0.922 0.107
Months 13-24 -0.428 0.313 -0.897 0.232 -0.010 0.174 -0.808 0.173
Months 24+ -1.443 0.377 -1.541 0.279 -0.626 0.196 -1.521 0.207
εu1 -3.086 0.745 -4.314 0.369 -3.941 0.222 -2.740 0.329
εu2-εu1 0.109 0.305 0.120 0.170 -0.054 0.137 0.419 0.125
εe1 -6.487 1.445 -5.017 0.658 -4.235 0.397 -3.906 0.482
εe2-εe1 2.672 0.537 1.821 0.251 1.783 0.225 1.032 0.138
εb1 0.201 1.334 1.734 0.763 -3.065 0.428 -6.958 1.033
εb2-εb1 7.633 0.640
π1 0.284 0.143 0.327 0.097 0.409 0.073 0.704 0.097
Log-Likelihood (Model 1)
Log-Likelihood (Model 2)
Log-Likelihood (Model 3)
COEF. S.E. COEF. S.E. COEF. S.E. COEF. S.E.
Duration Dependence
Unemployment
Months 6-12 0.093 0.146 -0.162 0.084 -0.142 0.061 -0.600 0.148
Months 13-24 -0.578 0.190 -1.013 0.118 -0.867 0.085 -0.710 0.158
Months 24+ -1.222 0.287 -1.598 0.154 -1.541 0.123 -2.127 0.245
Employment
Months 6-12 -0.220 0.282 0.533 0.099 -0.040 0.076 -0.180 0.270
Months 13-24 -0.767 0.303 -1.305 0.175 -1.176 0.107 -0.484 0.276
Months 24+ -0.960 0.316 -1.911 0.205 -1.559 0.124 -1.151 0.306
εu1 -2.924 0.758 -2.804 0.187 -3.053 0.139 -2.319 0.274
εu2-εu1 -0.841 0.286 0.791 0.115 0.286 0.079 0.304 0.227
εe1 -4.864 1.092 -3.689 0.302 -3.853 0.214 -3.998 0.659
εe2-εe1 0.527 0.467 0.990 0.137 1.022 0.099 2.495 0.346
εb1 -0.679 1.849 -7.583 1.944
εb2-εb1 7.517 0.562 0.609 0.544 8.967 1.875 3.502 1.007
π1 0.299 0.124 0.805 0.093 0.502 0.057 0.625 0.099
Log-Likelihood (Model 1) -1178.24
-inf
Unobs. Heterogeneity
Log-Likelihood (Model 2)
Log-Likelihood (Model 3) -1178.17 -1317.80 -1328.63 -1429.03
-1178.21 -1317.79 -1328.66 -1429.03
-1429.03
-1293.50 -1358.72 -1391.79
-1293.47 -1358.71 -1391.76
-1293.51 -1359.04 -1391.79
-1317.83 -1328.68
-1305.02
UK
-inf -inf -inf
-1305.02
-1305.02
Ireland Ital
-inf
y
Denmark France Germany Greece
Spain
Unobs. Heterogeneity
Notes: The estimates refer to the specification Employment I for the employment hazard of Table 
4 with two mass points for each equation and restricted correlation across the three equations 
(Model 1). The log-likelihood of Model 2 refers to the estimated model with two mass points in 
which the restriction in the correlation of the error terms is relaxed. The log-likelihood of Model 3 
allows for 3 mass points. 
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Table 6. Simulation of Survival in Unemployment and Employment for a Reference Individual by Benefits Status
Surv. S.E t Surv. S.E t Surv. S.E t Surv. S.E t
Recipients 0.504 0.119 4.24 0.421 0.078 5.36 0.543 0.071 7.66 0.430 0.066 6.56
Non-Recipients 0.347 0.095 3.65 0.282 0.062 4.53 0.362 0.057 6.36 0.338 0.048 7.11
Difference (U6) 0.156 0.152 1.03 0.138 0.100 1.38 0.181 0.090 2.01 0.091 0.080 1.14
Recipients 0.344 0.125 2.77 0.234 0.073 3.21 0.347 0.078 4.45 0.232 0.061 3.81
Non-Recipients 0.191 0.084 2.28 0.118 0.045 2.64 0.170 0.048 3.55 0.152 0.037 4.05
Difference (U12) 0.153 0.149 1.03 0.115 0.085 1.35 0.176 0.091 1.93 0.080 0.071 1.13
Recipients 0.885 0.076 11.60 0.904 0.039 23.47 0.935 0.026 35.89 0.791 0.046 17.30
Non-Recipients 0.717 0.131 5.46 0.681 0.090 7.56 0.788 0.060 13.22 0.756 0.042 17.84
Difference (E6) 0.168 0.151 1.11 0.223 0.097 2.30 0.146 0.065 2.25 0.035 0.062 0.56
Recipients 0.751 0.139 5.42 0.825 0.065 12.64 0.811 0.064 12.70 0.456 0.083 5.49
Non-Recipients 0.470 0.179 2.63 0.484 0.117 4.14 0.487 0.100 4.89 0.392 0.068 5.77
Difference (E12) 0.281 0.226 1.24 0.340 0.133 2.56 0.323 0.118 2.74 0.063 0.107 0.59
Surv. S.E t Surv. S.E t Surv. S.E t Surv. S.E t
Recipients 0.385 0.120 3.20 0.531 0.060 8.85 0.492 0.041 11.98 0.455 0.102 4.46
Non-Recipients 0.413 0.088 4.68 0.425 0.046 9.20 0.354 0.034 10.38 0.320 0.073 4.40
Difference (U6) -0.028 0.149 -0.19 0.106 0.075 1.41 0.137 0.053 2.58 0.134 0.125 1.07
Recipients 0.151 0.093 1.62 0.311 0.064 4.88 0.266 0.041 6.52 0.261 0.098 2.66
Non-Recipients 0.166 0.073 2.28 0.205 0.041 5.01 0.143 0.026 5.57 0.141 0.055 2.54
Difference (U12) -0.014 0.118 -0.12 0.106 0.075 1.41 0.122 0.048 2.54 0.120 0.112 1.07
Recipients 0.772 0.351 2.20 0.872 0.032 27.14 0.837 0.026 32.45 0.951 0.030 31.18
Non-Recipients 0.759 0.358 2.12 0.821 0.034 23.83 0.746 0.032 23.26 0.709 0.101 7.01
Difference (E6) 0.013 0.500 0.03 0.050 0.047 1.06 0.090 0.041 2.20 0.241 0.105 2.30
Recipients 0.725 0.377 1.92 0.694 0.065 10.68 0.705 0.042 16.88 0.916 0.048 18.96
Non-Recipients 0.711 0.383 1.86 0.592 0.062 9.53 0.563 0.046 12.12 0.554 0.130 4.25
Difference (E12) 0.014 0.537 0.03 0.101 0.089 1.13 0.142 0.062 2.29 0.362 0.138 2.62
GreeceGermanyFranceDenmark
Ireland Italy Spain UK
Survival in Unemployment after 6 months
Survival in Unemployment after 12 months
Survival in Employment after 6 months
Survival in Employment after 12 months
Survival in Unemployment after 6 months
Survival in Unemployment after 12 months
Survival in Employment after 6 months
Survival in Employment after 12 months
Notes: The survival rates are computed for a reference individual who is 25-29 years old with 
secondary education, married to a non-employed spouse, while the regional unemployment rate at 
the entry year into each state is kept at its mean value. For the survival in employment, a 
ard errors are calculated by simulation from the estimated asymptotic 
distribution of the parameters. 
distinction is made between previously unemployed recipients and non-recipients with 
unemployment duration between 1-6 months who are now in a full time job. The survival function 
is computed for the reference individual for each point of the discrete heterogeneity distribution 
and then weighted using the probability estimates for each point. Duration dependence is also 
taken into account. Stand
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Table B.1. Unemployment Benefits in Select
Schemes Employ
nmark Insurance
ance Insurance 4
rmany Insurance
Assistance Received U
ece Insurance 12
or
Insurance
Assistance
Ordinary
Special 43 week
Mobility 12 m
of
Insurance
Insurance Contributio
on which the 
25 times the
Assistance
ed European Countries.
ment/contributions conditions Payment rate Duration (months)
De 52 weeks in 3 years 90% of reference earnings 1+3 years
Fr  months in last 18 months 40% to 57% decreasing at 4 4-60 months depending on age
monthly intervals
Ge 12 months in 3 years 60% of net earnings for singles and 67% with children 12-64 months depending on age and contribution history
I during last year or being in need 53% of net earnings for single and 57% with children Unlimited - renewable every year
Gre 5 days during 14 months, 40% of daily wage for manual and 50% for white collar 5-12 months depending on contribution history
 200 days during 2 years
Ireland 39 weeks in 1 year Flat rate (98 Euros per week) 390 days
Means tested Flat rate (97-98 Euros per week) Unlimited
Italy 52 weeks in 2 years 30% of average wage in last 3 months 180 days
s in 2 years in building industry 80% of earnings 90 days
onths with at least 6 months 80% of earnings supplement 36 months
 effective work in a firm
Spain 12 months in 6 years 70% of earnings in first 180 days and 60% afterwards 4-24 months depending on contribution history
UK ns paid in one of the 2 tax years Flat rate (65-83 Euros per week) depending on age 182 days
claim is based amounting to at least 
 minimun contribution for that year
Means Tested Flat rate (99-130 Euros per week) depending on age Unlimited
Sourc  MISSOC (1994). e: European Commission,
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Table C.1. Hazard Estimates for Individual Characteristics
Coef. s.e. Coef. s.e. Coef. s.e. Coef. s.e.
Unemployment 
High Educ. -0.211 0.189 0.120 0.159 0.517 0.141 -0.019 0.120
Secondary Educ. -0.019 0.161 0.383 0.110 0.363 0.102 -0.086 0.091
Age 20-24 0.233 0.301 1.986 0.265 1.332 0.190 0.302 0.185
Age 25-29 0.760 0.262 2.002 0.249 1.407 0.174 0.475 0.163
Age 30-39 0.883 0.226 1.701 0.241 1.377 0.153 0.566 0.153
Age 40-49 0.715 0.250 1.500 0.240 1.052 0.146 0.280 0.143
Married 0.048 0.176 0.167 0.135 0.207 0.106 0.253 0.143
Number of Kids 0.054 0.083 0.049 0.052 0.053 0.044 0.090 0.056
Spouse Non-Emp. -0.387 0.168 0.142 0.124 -0.198 0.098 0.114 0.109
Regional Un. Rate 0.069 0.059 0.004 0.018 0.022 0.011 0.008 0.021
Employment I
Un. Dur. (1-6 M) 0.726 0.447 -0.113 0.221 -0.008 0.176 0.276 0.191
Un. Dur. (7-12 M) 0.887 0.490 -0.279 0.263 -0.070 0.204 -0.022 0.220
GreeceDenmark France Germany
High Educ. -0.198 0.329 -0.382 0.295 -0.639 0.224 -0.332 0.162
Secondary Educ. -0.187 0.262 -0.199 0.168 -0.250 0.153 -0.127 0.113
Age 20-24 -0.077 0.540 1.206 0.488 -0.791 0.272 0.310 0.233
Age 25-29 -0.316 0.411 0.753 0.476 -0.726 0.236 0.107 0.199
Age 30-39 -0.715 0.373 0.650 0.469 -0.811 0.201 0.167 0.183
Age 40-49 -0.749 0.414 0.599 0.475 -0.472 0.201 0.275 0.169
Married -0.310 0.312 -0.298 0.208 -0.204 0.164 -0.036 0.172
Number of Kids -0.024 0.149 0.030 0.091 -0.029 0.064 -0.032 0.067
Spouse Non-Emp. 0.127 0.296 0.078 0.219 0.174 0.152 0.239 0.134
Part-Time Job -0.763 0.618 0.416 0.227 0.593 0.261 0.142 0.139
Regional Un. Rate 0.098 0.114 0.033 0.028 0.038 0.017 -0.010 0.031
Benefit Equation
High Educ. 0.563 0.546 -0.067 0.354 -0.166 0.279 -0.666 0.291
Secondary Educ. -0.203 0.408 0.042 0.224 -0.179 0.218 -0.446 0.216
Age -0.012 0.018 0.027 0.013 0.271 0.010 -0.005 0.013
Married 0.344 0.445 0.144 0.279 -0.319 0.279 0.583 0.381
Number of Kids 0.250 0.255 -0.148 0.106 -0.259 0.107 0.160 0.138
Spouse Non-Emp. -0.015 0.375 0.129 0.269 -0.061 0.199 -0.101 0.299
Regional Un. Rate 0.343 0.093 0.021 0.041 -0.045 0.023 0.112 0.048
Months 6-12 2.650 1.025 2.495 0.514 3.182 0.466 2.535 0.591
Months 13-24 2.571 1.033 2.564 0.516 1.538 0.219 1.890 0.467
Months 24+ 0.334 0.490 1.281 0.341 0.904 0.205 2.299 1.028
 
(continues) 
Table C.1. Hazard Estimates for Individual Characteristics (cont.)
Unemployment 
High Educ. 0.216 0.245 0.466 0.189 0.074 0.085 0.304 0.122
Secondary Educ. 0.300 0.133 0.202 0.080 -0.052 0.067 0.050 0.159
Age 20-24 0.554 0.254 0.405 0.170 0.800 0.111 0.646 0.214
Age 25-29 0.594 0.258 0.371 0.157 0.789 0.106 0.554 0.211
Age 30-39 0.433 0.209 0.377 0.134 0.707 0.095 0.346 0.204
Age 40-49 0.304 0.201 0.319 0.137 0.573 0.099 0.211 0.194
Married 0.357 0.215 0.454 0.129 0.172 0.082 0.184 0.143
Number of Kids 0.008 0.054 0.047 0.045 -0.012 0.028 -0.072 0.055
Spouse Non-Emp. -0.167 0.181 -0.069 0.100 0.118 0.075 -0.357 0.141
Regional Un. Rate 0.030 0.052 -0.018 0.004 0.003 0.004 -0.027 0.022
Employment I
Un. Dur. (1-6 M) 0.071 0.338 0.359 0.155 0.288 0.108 -0.365 0.278
Un. Dur. (7-12 M) 0.538 0.344 0.405 0.170 0.364 0.118 -0.547 0.373
High Educ. 0.169 0.465 -0.109 0.247 -0.236 0.120 -0.620 0.245
Secondary Educ. -0.268 0.246 -0.068 0.109 -0.121 0.091 -0.527 0.298
Age 20-24 -0.260 0.486 -0.566 0.240 -0.436 0.145 -0.078 0.399
Age 25-29 -0.178 0.467 -0.367 0.210 -0.404 0.135 0.425 0.386
Age 30-39 0.062 0.356 -0.193 0.168 -0.445 0.120 -0.255 0.396
Age 40-49 0.306 0.337 -0.212 0.169 -0.196 0.121 -0.334 0.397
Married -0.112 0.334 -0.162 0.174 -0.398 0.113 -0.861 0.279
Number of Kids 0.115 0.099 -0.012 0.064 0.069 0.040 0.106 0.110
Spouse Non-Emp. -0.337 0.301 -0.142 0.130 0.055 0.100 0.242 0.269
Part-Time Job 0.792 0.250 0.101 0.144 0.532 0.113 0.203 0.278
Regional Un. Rate 0.019 0.079 0.029 0.005 0.039 0.006 0.014 0.040
Benefit Equation
High Educ. 0.836 0.725 0.103 0.454 0.202 0.190 0.058 0.366
Secondary Educ. -0.587 0.367 0.007 0.231 -0.155 0.144 -0.356 0.461
Age -0.016 0.021 0.022 0.015 0.013 0.006 -0.023 0.017
Married -1.084 0.656 0.967 0.406 0.553 0.168 0.169 0.381
Number of Kids 0.887 0.175 0.111 0.128 0.016 0.066 -0.008 0.158
Spouse Non-Emp. 1.063 0.642 -0.738 0.282 0.202 0.158 0.113 0.376
Regional Un. Rate -0.157 0.134 0.013 0.010 0.007 0.010 0.039 0.062
Months 6-12 . . 2.679 0.589 2.985 0.340 0.544 0.416
Months 13-24 0.513 0.563 1.536 0.403 1.778 0.220 1.095 0.554
Months 24+ 0.521 0.646 3.006 1.020 1.301 0.230 -0.303 0.471
UKIreland Italy Spain
Notes: The estimates for the observed individual characteristics for the unemployment and 
employment hazard refer to Table 4. For the employment hazard the specification Employment I 
 considered. is
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Table C.2. Benefit Estimates with Exits to Inactivity Treated as Censored Unemployment Spells
COEF. S.E COEF. S.E COEF. S.E COEF. S.E
Unemployment 
Receiving Benefits -0.561 0.278 -0.422 0.144 -0.407 0.137 -0.242 0.136
Employment I
Received Benefits -1.110 0.336 -1.476 0.185 -1.449 0.167 -0.181 0.142
Log-Likelihood
COEF. S.E COEF. S.E COEF. S.E COEF. S.E
Unemployment 
Receiving Benefits 0.201 0.254 -0.350 0.135 -0.406 0.076 -0.411 0.263
Employment I
Received Benefits -0.487 0.497 -0.357 0.153 -0.489 0.089 -2.104 0.375
Log-Likelihood -1121.91 -1267.44 -1267.98 -1256.66
Ireland Italy Spain UK
-1232.08 -1293.50
Denmark France Germany
-1250.60 -1350.26
Greece
 
Notes: These estimates are based on the flow sample of the unemployed, treating those who exit to 
inactivity as right censored. 
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Table C.3. Effect of Benefit Receipt on Unemployment and Employment Hazards by Level of Education
COEF. S.E COEF. S.E COEF. S.E COEF. S.E
Unemployment
Reveiving Benefits (RB) -0.450 0.358 -0.347 0.197 -0.478 0.188 -0.287 0.165
RB * High Education -0.399 0.419 -0.183 0.312 -0.427 0.270 0.082 0.275
RB * Medium Education 0.032 0.346 -0.105 0.221 -0.025 0.200 0.005 0.197
Employment 
Reveiving Benefits (RB) -0.594 0.519 -1.412 0.271 -1.557 0.287 -0.282 0.176
RB * High Education -2.085 0.824 -0.476 0.571 0.377 0.453 -0.230 0.332
RB * Medium Education -0.634 0.668 0.072 0.347 0.309 0.298 0.312 0.225
Log-Likelihood
COEF. S.E COEF. S.E COEF. S.E COEF. S.E
Unemployment
Reveiving Benefits (RB) 0.068 0.287 -0.383 0.143 -0.446 0.080 -0.580 0.259
RB * High Education 0.178 0.487 0.095 0.445 -0.027 0.167 -0.404 0.257
RB * Medium Education 0.029 0.284 0.175 0.192 0.227 0.134 0.042 0.343
Employment 
Reveiving Benefits (RB) -0.301 0.465 -0.487 0.162 -0.429 0.095 -1.870 0.411
RB * High Education 1.645 1.199 0.896 0.511 -0.432 0.236 -0.256 0.502
RB * Medium Education 0.055 0.556 0.251 0.232 -0.360 0.181 -1.412 0.817
Log-Likelihood
Ireland Italy Spain UK
  Denmark   France   Germany   Greece
-1305.01 -1293.51 -1359.04 -1391.79
-1429.03-1328.67-1317.83-1178.24  
Notes: The benefit indicators are interacted with the indicators of high and medium education. The 
unemployment and employment hazard functions are estimated jointly taking into account the 
endogeneity of benefits and allowing for correlated discrete unobserved heterogeneity. The model is 
estimated separately for each country including individual characteristics and year dummies for the year 
entering in unemployment and employment, respectively. 
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